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—  Note  — 
Providing a Release Valve:  
The U.S.-China Experience with 
the WTO Dispute Settlement 
System 
Abstract 
 Ever-expanding global trade relations have spawned highly 
contentious disputes between the United States and the People’s 
Republic of China, two of the world’s most powerful economic 
juggernauts. These trade frictions have sparked an increased 
utilization of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute 
settlement system. Has the WTO become a forum for proxy trade 
battles to play out between the United States and China? Or does the 
increase in trade disputes portend a more serious deterioration of 
economic relations that could devolve into an outright trade war?  
 This Note addresses this trend toward resorting to WTO dispute 
settlement through the lens of the legal, cultural, and social aspects of 
the Sino-American trade relationship. The discussion demonstrates 
that both the United States and China exhibit a willingness to comply 
with WTO rulings for myriad reasons. These reasons are presented 
using a framework that analyzes the impact of the institutional 
structure of the WTO’s dispute settlement system and the indirect 
benefits accrued through participation. While the WTO dispute 
settlement system provides both countries with a mechanism for 
resolving contentious trade issues, this Note attempts to advance a 
practical discourse about responsible management of WTO litigation. 
The United States and China have much to gain from the usage of 
the WTO’s dispute settlement system to resolve trade frictions and 
would do well to maintain such an advantageous system. 
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Introduction 
The sounds of saber rattling seem to emanate from the delicate 
relationship between the United States and China. Observers1 and 
media2 alike have proclaimed the possibility of a trade war looming on 
the horizon. While trade frictions between Washington and Beijing 
occur in nearly every facet of the relationship,3 the latest trends in 
World Trade Organization (WTO) litigation have garnered intense 
scrutiny. In recent years, both countries have initiated an increasingly 
higher volume of cases against one other. While many view this trend 
as a harbinger of a potential trade war, this Note will present an 
alternative interpretation of this trend in U.S.-Chinese WTO 
litigation. The litigation-intensive focus between the United States 
and China within the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
evidences the efficacy of the institution and the willingness of both 
countries to utilize the DSB as a viable trade-friction intermediary.   
1. See, e.g., Protectionism Risks Provoking Global Trade War, 63 INT’L 
BAR NEWS 51 (2009) [hereinafter Protectionism Provoking Trade War]. 
2. See, e.g., Richard Blackden, Trade War Fears After Obama Attack on 
China, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 18, 2012, at B1; Kathy Chu, Possible Trade 
Dispute Looms, USA TODAY, Jan. 9, 2012, at 5B. 
3. See Robert D. Hormats, Under Secretary for Economic Growth, Energy, 
and the Environment, Remarks at the Hopkins-Nanjing Center: The 
Future of U.S.-China Economic Relations (Dec. 6, 2012) (transcript 
available at http://www.state.gov/e/rls/rmk/2012/201631.htm) 
(discussing the various trade frictions that exist between the United 
States and China). 
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Part I analyzes the role of international dispute settlement in 
general, specifically those systems predicated on a rule orientation. 
This Part then introduces the process and operation of the DSB, the 
unique historical context of China’s accession to the WTO, and the 
early interactions between the United States and the People’s 
Republic in the DSB. Part I provides the necessary framework within 
which to analyze the relational developments between the two parties 
in the DSB as a rule-oriented international dispute settlement system.  
Part II addresses the argument that U.S. and Chinese decisions to 
resort to increased WTO litigation foreshadow the onset of a trade 
war. The components of the DSB that make it both a suitable forum 
for resolving contentious U.S.-Sino disputes are presented in Part III. 
These components will be analyzed through the characteristics that 
induce both China and the United States to utilize the DSB as a legal 
forum. Parts III.A and III.B introduce the direct institutional benefits 
and indirect benefits, respectively, that members are able to accrue. 
The accuracy of this Note’s contention is demonstrated in Part III.C, 
which analyzes two DSB cases between the United States and China: 
U.S.—Poultry4 and China—Intellectual Property Rights.5 These cases 
illustrate the willingness of both countries to submit important issues 
to the DSB. Furthermore, Part III.C discusses the importance of 
compliance by the losing parties and the implications of compliance as 
acceptance of the DSB’s legitimacy. Part III.D addresses the 
alternative mechanisms for resolving trade disputes that ultimately 
can be less appealing than engaging the DSB. Part IV identifies 
several limitations on this Note’s contention as to the long-term 
ability of the DSB to mitigate U.S.-Sino trade frictions.  
Finally, this Note presents some concluding suggestions about the 
future of the DSB as a viable mechanism for addressing burgeoning 
trade frictions between Beijing and Washington. This Part further 
reiterates the necessity of altering the discourse on U.S.-China WTO 
litigation from one of trade-war implications to one geared toward the 
responsible management of the DSB as a trade-friction intermediary, 
providing a beneficial legal forum for venting frustrations. 
 
4. Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Affecting Imports of 
Poultry from China, WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter 
U.S.—Poultry]. 
5. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection and 
Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 
2009) [hereinafter China—Intellectual Property Rights]. 
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I. Context and Historical Perspective 
A. Rule-Oriented Dispute Settlement in the International System 
 While a discussion of the entirety of the vast body of international 
dispute settlement is beyond the scope of this Note, it is important to 
examine certain aspects pertaining to the operation of the WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanism in order to understand the broader role of the DSB 
within the international system. International dispute settlement takes 
myriad forms including negotiations,6 good offices, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration,7 judicial settlement by permanent courts, and 
resort to regional agencies or arrangements.8 Unlike domestic courts, 
international dispute settlement uniquely involves the interaction of 
states as the frequent actors. International dispute settlement 
mechanisms are structured upon various theoretical foundations—
including power-oriented structures and rule-oriented structures—under 
which the members interact.9 A power-oriented structure is reliant on an 
“explicit or implicit reference to [a state’s] relative power and ‘bargaining 
chips.’”10 International dispute settlement based on power-orientation is 
characterized by “unilateral retortions [sic] and reprisals,” which run the 
risk of provoking retaliatory countermeasures.11 Such a structure differs 
immensely when juxtaposed with a rule-oriented system that is 
predicated on the “enforcement of rules that were previously agreed by 
both parties.”12 Within a rule-oriented structure, dispute settlement 
operates as the mechanism for enforcing the previously agreed upon rules 
between the various states.13 Although the power-oriented structure of 
international dispute settlement provides for an interesting discourse, this 
Note will focus on the proliferation of rule orientation as a viable 
international dispute settlement mechanism, specifically with regard to 
the WTO’s dispute settlement system.  
 
6. Negotiation between parties to the dispute is the basis of the 
consultations stage of the WTO dispute settlement system. Under this 
framework, the parties are obligated to engage in consultation request 
and provide “sympathetic consideration” to the other member’s 
concerns. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 
401 [hereinafter DSU]. For a discussion of the value of negotiation as a 
beneficial, and perhaps more desirable, dispute settlement mechanism 
within the WTO, see Amelia Porges, Settling WTO Disputes: What Do 
Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 141 (2003). 
7. For a discussion of the role of arbitration within the DSB, see Yasuhei 
Taniguchi, The WTO Dispute Settlement as Seen by a Proceduralist, 
42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 10-12 (2009).  
8. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic 
Law—Lessons for Strengthening International Dispute Settlement in 
Non-Economic Areas, 2 J. INT’L ECON. L. 189, 195 (1999) [hereinafter 
Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law]. The 
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 A rule-oriented structure provides all members of the system with a 
plethora of benefits that induce acceptance and a willingness to resort to 
dispute settlement in order to preserve expected benefits from the rules. 
For one, the existence of a viable dispute settlement system bolsters the 
value of the commitments made within an international agreement 
 
Dispute Settlement Understanding contains a number of the available 
forms of international dispute settlement to be utilized at various stages 
of the dispute process. The DSU provides at various instances for 
“bilateral and multilateral consultations (Article 4), good offices 
(Articles 5, 24), conciliation (Articles 5, 24), mediation (Articles 5, 
24), . . . and international arbitration (Article 25).” Id. at 209. The DSU 
further provides a legalized dispute settlement mechanism that operates 
as a quasi-judicial structure involving panel and appellate review 
procedures. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution: 
Proliferation, Fragmentation, and Decentralization of Dispute 
Settlement in International Trade, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 273, 302, 
309 (2006) [hereinafter Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution]. 
Although the DSB contains a variety of dispute settlement mechanisms, 
this Note focuses on the quasi-judicial structure encapsulated in panel 
and Appellate Body determinations.  
9. See J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 235–36 
(4th ed. 2005) (discussing the switch from the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) system of dispute settlement to the WTO 
dispute settlement as being termed a switch from a “power-oriented” 
approach to a “rule-oriented” approach); Petersmann, Dispute 
Settlement in International Economic Law, supra note 8, at 193–95 
(citing JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND 
POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 109 (2d ed. 1997)).  
10. Petersmann, Dispute Settlement in International Economic Law, supra note 
8, at 194. Petersmann discusses the United Nations’ dispute settlement 
system as a prime example of a power-oriented structure. Id. at 190–91. 
11. Id. at 194. 
12. Id. The WTO system was founded as a rule-based organization wherein 
all members agreed upon accession to be bound by all covered 
agreements and the compulsory jurisdiction of the DSB. As such, the 
theoretical foundation of the DSB’s dispute settlement system is 
centered on a rule-based orientation.  
13. Id. Petersmann’s hypothesis concerning the efficacy of a rule-oriented 
structure relies on three factors: (1) the applicable substantive rules; 
(2) the availability of a legal dispute settlement system that induces 
both usage of the system and compliance with outcomes; and (3) the 
legal limitation of a member’s ability to resort to alternative dispute 
resolution methods. Id. at 197–98. Applying these factors to the DSB, it 
is clear that the WTO structure exhibits strong attributes of all three 
factors. First, the substantive rules related to the DSB are the covered 
agreements that compose the foundation of the WTO. Second, the panel 
determinations and appellate review induce members to utilize the DSB 
and to comply with adverse rulings. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
Finally, the DSU contains provisions requiring members to utilize the 
DSB as recourse for WTO disputes. DSU, supra note 6, art. 23.  
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through an assurance of the agreement’s enforcement.14 Credible 
commitments in turn promote stability and consistency within the 
international order, particularly within the international economic 
system.15 In addition, the basis for the system provides states with an 
incentive, and in some systems a requirement,16 to utilize the dispute 
settlement system rather than resort to potentially more deleterious 
alternative dispute settlement measures.17 With pre-determined rules 
instead of power politics as the foundation of the system, states are 
provided an opportunity to raise disputes from a position of equality.18 As 
such, rule-oriented international dispute settlement mitigates the power 
dynamics that can often damage international relations between states 
and the associated international organizations. The rule-based structure 
“helps to prevent the detrimental effects of unresolved international trade 
conflicts and to mitigate the imbalances between stronger and weaker 
players by having their disputes settled on the basis of rules rather than 
having power determine the outcome.”19 Furthermore, dispute settlement 
within the context of a comprehensive international organization provides 
a forum in which members can effectively negotiate and resolve 
discrepancies. The forum benefits the parties through a reduction in both 
transaction costs and asymmetric information.20 Finally, under rule-
oriented structures, dispute settlement mechanisms can provide the 
 
14. WTO & INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 128 (Sun Fa Bai et al. eds., 
2008). 
15. See, e.g., Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge, Legitimacy, Efficiency and the 
Institutionalization of Dispute Settlement Procedures at the World 
Trade Organization and the World Intellectual Property Organization, 
22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 389, 394 (2002) (“Markets demand credible, 
enforceable commitments to function properly.”).  
16. Within the WTO system, member states are obligated under the DSU 
to utilize the dispute settlement system for resolving disputes involving 
the covered agreements. DSU, supra note 6, art. 23. 
17. See XUESEN ZHANG & GARY D. PATTERSON, LEGAL RULES OF THE 
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 361 (English ed. 2008) (“The objective of 
these rules and procedures [is] to avoid unilateral actions that could 
destabilize[ ] and disrupt international trade, which could lead to 
inconsistency among nations in terms of trade policy and cause 
uncertainty in private transactions regarding international trade.”).  
18. See, e.g., Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution, supra note 8, at 
359 (“The rule-oriented WTO dispute settlement system clearly 
mitigates power disparities in international relations and helps 
governments limit power politics inside their countries (e.g., by limiting 
protectionist abuses of trade policy discretion in favor of rent-seeking 
interest groups by requiring independent judicial remedies inside 
countries like China that did not have such legal institutions prior to 
WTO membership).”). 
19. WTO & INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, supra note 14, at 128.  
20. Ryan, supra note 15, at 395. 
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benefit of clarifying the rules and obligations enumerated under the 
various covered agreements.21 Clarification of the rules through dispute 
settlement offers a consistency and clarity throughout the international 
order by removing ambiguities and uncertainties pertaining to the agreed 
rights and obligations. 
B. Role of the Dispute Settlement Body 
The DSB stands as one of the achievements of the Uruguay 
Round of Negotiations in 1995 that resulted in the creation of the 
World Trade Organization.22 The DSB was designed to remedy a 
number of the weaknesses23 and failures of its predecessor, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’s (GATT) dispute settlement 
system.24 The efficacy of the GATT dispute settlement system was 
 
21. See Petersmann, Justice as Conflict Resolution, supra note 8, at 359 
(noting the growing influence of such clarifications over multilateral 
WTO negotiations); Wei Zhuang, An Empirical Study of China's 
Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism: 2001–2010, 4 
LAW & DEV. REV. 217, 218 (2011) (describing participation in the DSB 
as “essential for shaping the interpretation and application of WTO law 
over time”). Although the DSB is not predicated on a formalized 
common law approach, “Appellate Body and panel reliance on and 
citation of past WTO jurisprudence suggest WTO law’s common law 
orientation.” Id. 
22. MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 211-12, 233; see also Chi Manjiao, China’s 
Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement over the Past Decade: 
Experiences and Impacts, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 29, 29 (2012) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (calling the DSB the “the jewel of the crown 
of the World Trade Organization”); Matthew Kennedy, China’s Role in 
WTO Dispute Settlement, 11 WORLD TRADE REV. 555, 555 (2012) 
(discussing the importance of the DSB as a “major contributor to the 
WTO’s success”). 
23 . For an example of the differences between the GATT and WTO 
treatment of the same trade remedy measure see generally Mostafa 
Beshkar, Trade Skirmishes Safeguards: A Theory of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Process, 82 J. INT’L ECON. 35 (2010) (discussing the evolution 
of members’ utilization of the safeguard mechanism between GATT 
Article XIX and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards). 
24. MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 214; see also Leah Granger, Explaining the 
Broad-Based Support for WTO Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 
521, 524 (2006) (“The failures of the GATT dispute settlement system 
set the stage for countries to later support the WTO’s stronger rule-
based system.”); Donald McRae, Measuring the Effectiveness of the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 1, 4 (2008) (“Dispute settlement under the WTO is compulsory, 
cannot be blocked, has a defined timeline and a more fully articulated 
process, and includes an appellate process, making it different in many 
important respects from the old GATT process.”). But see generally 
Kim Van der Borght, Justice for All in the Dispute Settlement System 
of the World Trade Organization?, 39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 787 
(2011) (highlighting the shortcomings of the DSB with regard to 
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frustrated by the consensus requirement for decision making. This 
allowed nations whose measures were challenged to constructively 
block the establishment of a panel or the implementation of an 
adverse ruling.25 The flaws inherent in the GATT system prompted 
the desire for change when forming the WTO. Positive change was 
accomplished through an adherence to binding panel and Appellate 
Body determinations whose adoption requirement was changed to 
reverse consensus.26 This transformation in decision-making 
requirements greatly diminished the role of politics within 
international trade dispute settlement in favor of a rule-oriented, legal 
forum. At the center of the WTO’s newly created dispute settlement 
system is the Dispute Settlement Body, entrusted with the responsibility 
of resolving trade disputes under the WTO covered agreements.27 
As an organ of the WTO, the DSB is designed to “provid[e] 
security and predictability to the multilateral trading system” and to 
“preserve the rights and obligations of Members.”28 The WTO 
implements a formalized dispute settlement structure to enforce and 
promote these enumerated goals.29 Unlike the previous GATT regime, 
 
developing countries); Sean P. Feeney, The Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO Agreement: An Inadequate Mechanism for 
the Resolution of International Trade Disputes, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. 
L.J. 99, 114 (2002) (examining “major problems” that still exist in the 
DSU); see also Ryan, supra note 15, at 404 (“[A] growing number of 
scholars and other observers opine that decision-making at the 
organization is undemocratic and call into question the legitimacy of the 
WTO laws which underlie dispute settlement decisions.”). 
25. MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 214 (“An obvious weakness of the panel 
procedure was that since both setting up a panel and the adoption of its 
report required consensus in the GATT Council, it was possible for a 
state whose actions were challenged to block effective action.”); John D. 
Greenwald & Lynn Fischer Fox, The WTO’s Emphasis on Adjudicated 
Dispute Settlement May Be More Drag Than Lift, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 133, 133–34 (2007) (noting that panel decisions under the 
GATT system did not have the “force of a binding legal decision”). 
26. DSU, supra note 6, art. 16.4 (establishing that the panel report will be 
accepted unless the ruling is appealed or “the DSB decides by consensus 
not to adopt the report”); see also MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 214 
(noting that the changes made with the WTO system “effectively 
remove[d] the political check on panel procedures”). 
27. See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 234 (noting the importance of the DSB 
as being “political[ly] responsib[le] for integrating the dispute settlement 
system and ensuring its effectiveness”). 
28. DSU, supra note 6, art. 3.2.  
29. See JEANNE J. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20088, DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: AN OVERVIEW 3–5 
(2006) (providing an overview of the steps involved in a dispute before 
the DSB). See generally Marian Ladner & Ogbo Ossai, Dispute 
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the WTO dispute settlement system is compulsory for all WTO 
members.30 This commitment conveys the willingness of all members 
to bind themselves in advance to the adjudicatory powers of the 
DSB.31 The system is designed to compel losing respondents to bring 
any offending measure(s) into conformity with WTO obligations 
rather than to render punitive damages.32 One innovative feature of 
the DSB is the Appellate Body, which allows the losing party to 
appeal an adverse judgment from the panel determination.33 Other 
features include the framework of process deadlines and compliance-
monitoring mechanisms that generate an “integrated dispute 
settlement” whereby the same rules apply to all disputes leveled 
under the covered agreements, unless specifically provided for under 
an agreement.34 The DSB’s adjudicatory process is an essential 
element of the WTO system, maintaining and promoting the 
organization’s goal of “develop[ing] an integrated, more viable and 
durable multilateral trading system.”35 In doing so, the DSB occupies 
a unique legal position within the international community as its 
utilization provides a novel legalized structure with which to protect 
the concessions and expected benefits of all members. 
C. China’s Accession to the WTO 
The process of negotiating China’s membership in the WTO was 
long and arduous.36 In negotiating its accession, China made a number 
 
Settlement in the World Trade Organization, 20 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 
15–16 (2007) (discussing the process for dispute settlement: consultation, 
panel, appeal, and implementation). 
30. See Manjiao, supra note 22, at 29 (noting the “binding force” of DSB 
decisions due to the threat of sanctions); see also Zhuang, supra note 21, 
at 218 (citing the DSB’s “exclusive and compulsory jurisdiction on 
matters arising under WTO agreements” as a source of its “unique 
power as an international dispute settlement body”). Additionally, for a 
discussion of the GATT mechanism for initiating and resolving disputes, 
see MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 213–14.  
31. See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 234 (“Though styled an ‘understanding’, 
the DSU is an integral part of the WTO Agreement and according to 
Article 2(2) legally binding.”). 
32. Ladner & Ossai, supra note 29, at 17. For additional discussion of the 
lack of punitive damages in the DSB’s remedies, see infra note 77 and 
accompanying text.  
33. Granger, supra note 24, at 523; see also infra notes 79–85 and 
accompanying text. 
34. GRIMMETT, supra note 29, at 2. 
35. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 155 (1994). 
36. Many observers recognize the difficulties of China’s path to WTO 
membership but submit that, despite these issues, China’s ultimate 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 1·2013 
Providing a Release Valve 
210 
of unique concessions on issues of trade in both goods and services 
that far exceeded the obligations of other WTO members.37 Despite 
the myriad unique obligations in China’s Accession Protocol, China 
still viewed WTO membership as a vital component of its long-term 
 
accession to the organization is beneficial for every member of the 
WTO. See, e.g., Wenhua Ji & Cui Huang, China’s Experience in 
Dealing with WTO Dispute Settlement: A Chinese Perspective, 45 J. 
WORLD TRADE 1, 1 (2011) (alteration in original) (noting that although 
the Chinese accession to the WTO was the result of fifteen years of 
“tough negotiations,” China’s membership is “an important step 
towards making the WTO a truly world organization”). But see, e.g., 
Xiaohui Wu, No Longer Outside, Not Yet Equal: Rethinking China’s 
Membership in the World Trade Organization, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 
227, 232, 269 (2011) (emphasis added) (viewing China’s accession process 
as the result of “protracted and tortuous negotiations” in which “China 
was pressed to accept exceptionally [unfavorable], non-reciprocal and 
asymmetric terms of membership” that warrant a reexamination of 
China’s membership status in the WTO). China’s accession also sparked 
mixed sentiments about the impact of China on the WTO and the DSB, 
in particular. See generally Peter K. Yu et al., China and the WTO: 
Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2003), for a 
panel discussion that “reflect[s]” on China’s accession to the WTO and 
“explore[s] its ramifications.” 
37. Two primary burdensome concessions revolve around Articles 15 and 16 
of the Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China. 
Article 15 allows other WTO members to utilize nonmarket-economy 
methodologies when conducting antidumping investigations under 
certain conditions for goods originating in China. World Trade Org., 
Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, pt. 1, § 15, 
at 8-9, WT/L/432 (Nov. 10, 2001) [hereinafter China Accession 
Protocol], available at www.wto.org. Article 16 creates a unique 
transitional safeguard mechanism only applicable to Chinese goods. Id. 
pt. 1, § 16, at 9–10; see also Manjiao, supra note 22, at 35 (noting the 
wide range of WTO-plus obligations China accepted including 
“commitments concerning transparency, judicial review, uniform 
administration, national treatment, foreign investment, market 
economy, and transitional review”); Henry Gao, Elephant in the Room: 
Challenges of Integrating China into the WTO System, 6 ASIAN J. WTO 
& INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 137, 147-51 (2011) (“The Mismatch between 
the China-specific Provisions and the Normal WTO Framework”); 
Chad P. Bown, U.S.–China Trade Conflicts and the Future of the 
WTO, 33 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 27, 33 (2009) (“As a price of 
China’s accession, the membership demanded that Beijing take on many 
more policy commitments than had traditionally been required of other 
acceding countries . . . .”); Julia Ya Qin, “WTO-Plus” Obligations and 
Their Implications for the World Trade Organization Legal System, 
37 J. WORLD TRADE 483 (2003) (discussing the unique concessions 
contained within China’s Accession Protocol, as well as the Report of the 
Working Party on the Accession of China, and the potential long-term 
impact of incorporating WTO-plus obligations in accession protocols). 
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economic prosperity.38 China even accepted the mandatory 
jurisdiction of the DSB—a monumental step in Beijing’s affirmation 
of the role of the international system.39 China joined the “club of 
rule-abiding countries”40 as it was instituting extensive measures to 
bring its economy into conformity with accession obligations.41 
Throughout China’s negotiations, the United States consistently 
advocated for China’s membership in the WTO.42 The United States 
had a particular interest in bringing China into a rule-oriented, 
formalized system that allowed for compulsory adjudication of trade 
frictions and violations of economic commitments.43 Despite the 
difficult accession negotiations, both China and the United States 
recognized the long-term benefits of WTO membership for the 
People’s Republic.44  
D. U.S.-China Interaction Within the Dispute Settlement Body 
In order to fully appreciate the recent trends in WTO litigation 
between Beijing and Washington, it is necessary to examine the 
dynamic between the two powers during the first five years of China’s 
WTO membership (2001–06). The initial years were relatively calm in 
terms of litigation as China became acclimated to the new system.45 
Scholars and observers have posited numerous explanations for 
 
38. See Pasha L. Hsieh, China’s Development of International Economic 
Law and WTO Legal Capacity Building, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 997, 998 
(2010) (arguing that China’s dynamic economic growth over the last 
several decades would not have been possible if not for its accession to 
the WTO). 
39. See Pasha L. Hsieh, China-United States Trade Negotiations and 
Disputes: The WTO and Beyond, 4 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 369, 391 (2009) (“The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the 
first and only state-to-state ‘international court’ under which China has 
consented to mandatory jurisdiction.”); Zhuang, supra note 21, at 218 
(“[T]he WTO DSB is the only international ‘court’ of compulsory 
jurisdiction that China has recognized without reservation, and remains 
the only international judicial body to which China has resorted.”). 
40. SUSAN SHIRK, CHINA: FRAGILE SUPERPOWER 132 (2007). 
41. See, e.g., KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION 
THROUGH REFORM 322 (2004) (arguing that China’s transformation of 
domestic measures is “accelerating [China’s] integration into the 
international economy”).  
42. SHIRK, supra note 40, at 25 (going as far as to call the United States the 
“chief sponsor” of China’s accession).  
43. Hsieh, supra note 39, at 375. 
44. See infra notes 111–19 and accompanying text. 
45. See Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 2 (calling the early phase when 
other trading partners did not engage China in DSB litigation a 
“honeymoon period”). 
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China’s reticence to utilize the DSB including its “non-litigious legal 
traditions,”46 a lack of internal legal capacity,47 and limitations 
imposed within China’s accession protocol.48 In fact, China did not 
have to defend itself as a respondent until three years after its 
accession in 200449 and defended against only one other complaint in 
the first five years.50 During this period, China brought only one case 
against the United States.51 Some believed that the rhetoric 
emanating from Beijing in 2005 indicated that China would not 
actively utilize the DSB to resolve trade frictions.52 Beijing’s official 
stance began to change in 2006 when it proclaimed that China would 
utilize the WTO and the DSB to properly handle trade frictions.53 
A juxtaposition of the inactivity during the initial five-year period 
with interactions since 2006 demonstrates the trend toward an 
increasing utilization of DSB litigation by both China and the United 
States.54 For example, the United States brought thirteen WTO cases 
 
46. Zhuang, supra note 21, at 231 (discussing China’s traditional preference 
to settle dispute through noncontentious means so as not to cause any 
party a public “loss of face”). 
47. Xiaojun Li, Understanding China’s Behavioral Change in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System: Power, Capacity, and Normative 
Constraints in Trade Adjudication, 52 ASIAN SURVEY 1111, 1125 (2012); 
Zhuang, supra note 21, at 231. 
48. Chad P. Bown, China’s WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and 
Dispute Settlement, in CHINA’S GROWING ROLE IN WORLD TRADE 281, 
328 (Robert C. Feenstra & Shang-Jin Wei eds., 2010) (citing China’s 
continued designation as a “Non-Market Economy” under China’s 
accession protocol as a contributing factor). 
49. Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Value-Added 
Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/1 (Mar. 18, 2004). 
50. Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Imports of 
Automobile Parts, WT/DS340/AB/R (Dec. 15, 2008). 
51. Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Safeguard Measures 
on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS251/AB/R (Nov. 10, 
2003) [hereinafter U.S.—Steel Safeguards]. 
52. See, e.g., Li, supra note 47, at 1132–33 (analyzing comments from Bo 
Xilai, then Beijing’s Minister of Commerce, and the cryptic rhetoric 
contained within the China’s State Council’s white paper China’s 
Peaceful Development Road).  
53. Id. at 1133 (citing Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council, 
Report of the Work of the Government, (Mar. 5, 2006) available 
at http://web.archive.org/web/20081014232653/http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2006-03/15/content_538753.htm (providing the full-text 
version of the Premier’s report that was delivered at the Fourth Session 
of the Tenth National People's Congress)).  
54. See Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 2 (“After this honeymoon period was 
over, . . . China’s major trade partners intensified their WTO legal 
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against China between 2007 and 2012—three in 2007, two in 2008, 
one in 2009, three in 2010, one in 2011, and three in 2012.55 The 
United States went from initiating two cases over five years against 
China to thirteen cases over six years.56 Similarly, China has initiated 
a higher volume of cases against the United States since 2006—one in 
2007, one in 2008, two in 2009,57 one in 2011, and two in 2012.58 
China’s altered reliance on the DSB to resolve trade frictions with the 
United States is evident considering that China utilized the dispute 
settlement system once in the first five years and seven times in the 
subsequent six years. The statistical variations in litigation reliance 
within the WTO intimate a marked shift in both countries’ strategies 
for resolving trade frictions.59 In fact, litigation between Beijing and 
Washington accounts for a significant portion of both countries’ 
overall DSB interactions. Both parties’ drastic changes in the usage of 
the DSB continue to garner significant discourse on the trend’s 
motivations and implications, particularly whether these changes 
symbolize a positive or negative development for the international 
trading system.  
II.  Does Increased Litigation Portend the Onset of a 
Trade War? 
As Beijing and Washington alter their attitude toward the DSB, 
many interpret the aggressive litigation focus as a harbinger of a trade 
war between the two economic juggernauts. Some believe such an 
 
challenges against China, and, in response, China took on a higher 
offensive profile . . . .”). 
55. Chronological List of Disputes Cases, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm 
(last visited Aug. 13, 2013). As of August 13, 2013, China has not filed 
any new cases against the United States in 2013. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. China’s increased activity within the entire WTO in 2009 led many to 
term the year the “WTO’s China year.” Li, supra note 47, at 1112 
(quoting Li Chenggang, the Deputy Director of the Ministry of 
Commerce’s Department of Treaty and Law, at the annual conference of 
the Shanghai Consulting Center for the WTO in December 2009); see 
also Manjiao, supra note 22, at 32 (“Year 2009 is deemed as ‘the year of 
China for the WTO dispute settlement’ since 7 out of the 14 cases filed 
in that year involved China.”). 
58. Chronological List of Disputes Cases, supra note 55. As of August 13, 
2013, the United States has not filed any new cases against China in 
2013. Id. 
59. Matthew Kennedy, formerly a senior lawyer in the WTO Secretariat, 
referred to China’s drastic shift in its utilization of the DSB as “the 
most significant change in the identity of the [DSB’s] top participants 
since the establishment of the WTO.” Kennedy, supra note 22, at 559. 
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event is imminent under current conditions. The rise in dumping 
charges, the political unwillingness to compromise, and the 
“proliferation of trade conflicts and protectionist measures” are cited 
as evidence of an escalating movement toward a full-blown trade 
war.60 Other observers point to “tit-for-tat” WTO complaint filings as 
evidence of the deterioration of U.S.-Sino relations.61 The increased 
litigation discussed in Part I.C is seen as a negative development that 
could have dangerous effects if not diminished.62 Others temper this 
sentiment by pointing to specific failures on either side that could 
cause the relationship to devolve into a trade war. Chad P. Bown, 
Senior Economist for the World Bank’s Trade and International 
Integration Development Research Group, discusses that the inherent 
nature of litigation is volatile.63 Bown questions the ability of China 
and the United States to utilize the DSB in a positive manner that 
mitigates frictions.64 While not decrying a trade war as inevitable, 
Bown does say that “we are in for some U.S–China fireworks 
emanating from Geneva.”65 While trade frictions do exist and at times 
can get extremely heated, this Note advances a different 
interpretation of the increased litigation: a sentiment that views the 
trend as a positive development with the two economic juggernauts 
willing to resolve disputes through a rule-based, formal system. As the 
interaction between Beijing and Washington becomes more regular 
within the DSB, the possibility substantially diminishes for either to 
 
60. Protectionism Provoking Trade War, supra note 1, at 51–52.  
61. See, e.g., Offensive Maneuvers, CHINA ECON. REV., Dec. 2012, at 6–7; 
see also Chu, supra note 2 (discussing concerns that an imposition of 
U.S. tariffs on Chinese solar-cell makers could lead to the reemergence of 
the “tit-for-tat trade spat that gained traction in 2009 when President 
Obama slapped steep duties on Chinese tires” and manifest itself in an 
“all-out trade war”). 
62. See Kara Loridas, Note, United States-China Trade War: Signs of 
Protectionism in a Globalized Economy?, 34 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. 
REV. 403, 413 (2011) (emphasis added) (“As a result of the onslaught of 
WTO litigation between the United States and China, their relationship 
was characterized by the media as war-like, a characterization that 
speaks more to the political ramifications of the disputed trade barriers 
than to their economic magnitude.”); see also Chu, supra note 2 
(discussing the implications of “tit-for-tat” tariff impositions as 
escalating trade frictions). 
63. See Bown, supra note 37, at 31 (“In these WTO disputes, what starts as 
seemingly harmless legal maneuvering and argumentation often turns 
into political battles, threats, and legally-sanctioned implementation of 
actual retaliation, and media-fed worries of an all-out trade war.”).  
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 32.  
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make such a catastrophic “misstep”66 that would cause the 
relationship to devolve into a trade war. 
III. Characteristics Making the Dispute Settlement 
Body Appealing 
A.  Dispute Settlement Body’s Institutional Impact 
The DSB provides a number of direct benefits through its 
organizational structure and rule-based system.67 Membership in the 
WTO assumes that nations will fulfill trade-related commitments and 
realize expected benefits.68 The WTO deals broadly with the rules of 
trade between nations, encompassing a host of responsibilities both 
globally and intergovernmentally.69 The DSB stands as the forum 
through which WTO rules and obligations are protected.70 Serving as 
a crucial component to the WTO’s operation, the DSB attempts to 
promote stability within the international trading system.71 When a 
member abrogates its WTO obligation, the DSB provides a dispute 
settlement process for aggrieved parties to seek remedy.72  
First, the remedies available within the DSB structure provide a 
direct benefit to both the complainant and respondent. For the 
complainant, a favorable outcome from a panel ruling results in a 
judgment ordering the removal of the respondent’s disputed 
 
66. Id. at 31.  
67. The function, role, and rules of the WTO’s dispute settlement system 
are encapsulated in Annex 2 of the WTO Agreement, the Understanding 
on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes. The 
Dispute Settlement Body is established within this Understanding “to 
administer [the Understanding’s] rules and procedures and . . . the 
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the covered 
agreements.” DSU, supra note 6, art. 2.1.  
68. Every member of the WTO expects to receive the benefits of the WTO 
system’s primary tenets: (1) the Most Favored Nation Principle; (2) the 
National Treatment Principle; (3) reciprocal tariff concessions; and (4) a 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions. General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade arts. I, II, III, and XI, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 
U.N.T.S. 194. 
69. The WTO identifies the numerous dimensions it covers as an 
international trade organization including liberalizing trade, serving as a 
forum for nations to negotiate trade agreements, resolving trade 
disputes, and operating a system of trade rules. What is the World 
Trade Organization?, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english
/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2013). 
70. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text. 
71. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.  
72. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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measure.73 Retaliation, as a permissible remedy, is allowed only as a 
“last resort” and is subject to a number of institutional limitations 
when a member fails to bring the measure into conformity with the 
DSB decision.74 The complainant’s retaliatory measures are only 
“temporary” and can consist of a suspension of concessions at a level 
“equivalent” to the harm.75 Given the various remedy measures, the 
complainant is provided some way to mitigate the harmful effects of 
the offending member’s measure. 
Even when faced with an unfavorable verdict, the respondent is 
able to directly benefit from the structured remedy system within the 
DSB. The limitations surrounding retaliation ensure that the 
respondent is confronted by temporary measures that the DSB 
determines are equivalent to the respondent’s offending measure.76 
This remedy application mitigates the prospect of punitive damages 
that are meant to punish offending nations beyond the actual harm 
incurred.77 These limitations also prevent escalation of a “tit-for-tat” 
trade war. Even when a complainant is permitted to retaliate, such 
actions are narrowly tailored to minimize the disturbance in 
liberalizing trade.78  
These benefits provided by the DSB incentivize member nations, 
such as the United States and China, to utilize the formal forum 
rather than to engage in potentially volatile bilateral negotiations,79 
especially considering the lack of limitations on national action 
outside a formal international organization. This instills a confidence 
within both countries that a loss in the DSB will not result in 
 
73. See DSU, supra note 6, art. 3.7 (“[T]he first objective of the dispute 
settlement mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the 
measures concerned if [the measures] are found to be inconsistent with 
the provisions of any of the covered agreements.”).  
74. Id. 
75. Id. arts. 22.1, 22.4. 
76. Id. 
77. See McRae, supra note 24, at 8 (clarifying that “WTO compensation 
and retaliation are sanctions” not in the sense of punishing members as 
in criminal law but rather in the sense of inducing compliance as may be 
found in contract or tort law); see also Granger, supra note 24, at 523 
(citing ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, CRIMES & PUNISHMENTS? RETALIATION 
UNDER THE WTO (2003); DAVID PALMETER, THE WTO AS A LEGAL 
SYSTEM: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND POLICY 346 (2003)) 
(“The DSU limits the form and scope of retaliations because the goal of 
dispute settlement is to support and maintain the integrity of the 
trading regime.”).  
78. See Bown, supra note 37, at 35 (comparing the WTO retaliation 
structure to “surgical retaliation” and pronouncing a “political 
difference” between WTO retaliation and “blunt force retaliation”). 
79. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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exorbitant penalties that ultimately dwarf the initial harms.80 The 
guarantee of proportionality allows both the United States and China 
to conduct a cost-benefit analysis concerning the maintenance of a 
measure, particularly when the removal of a WTO inconsistent 
measure is not politically feasible at the time of the panel 
determination.81 Furthermore, both the United States and China can 
feel assured that taking sensitive topics to the DSB will not result in 
the imposition of additional obligations other than those agreed to 
and enumerated in the covered WTO agreements.82 This ensures that 
no outcome from the DSB can burden either country with obligations 
that have not been fully negotiated and from which they could not 
opt out. These measures operate as safeguards that build faith in the 
efficacy of the WTO as an international organization entrusted with a 
mandatory dispute settlement system.  
Second, the advent of the appellate process within the 
international trading system allows for review of panel decisions, 
providing a higher level of scrutiny and consistency.83 The Appellate 
Body is designed to provide legitimacy to the economic dispute 
settlement system through a focus on the composition, scope of 
review, and structured deadlines. For composition, the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) provides specific qualifications for 
persons serving on the Appellate Body in order to bolster the validity 
and legitimacy of appellate review determinations.84 The scope of the 
appellate review does not include fact finding, which is the role 
specifically delegated to the panel.85 Instead, the design of the DSB 
 
80. The DSU provides further safeguard mechanisms to ensure that retaliatory 
authorization is not abused through a resort to binding arbitration if the 
offending party objects to the level of concession suspension. DSU, supra 
note 6, arts. 22.6-22.7; MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 230. 
81. DSU, supra note 6, art. 21.3 (granting the offending member a 
“reasonable period of time” to bring the measure into conformity if 
immediate compliance is “impracticable”). 
82. Id. art. 3.2 (“Recommendations and rulings of the DSB cannot add to or 
diminish the rights and obligations provided in the covered 
agreements.”). 
83. Ryan, supra note 15, at 403. 
84. For one, the DSB appoints persons to serve on the Appellate Body for a 
four-year term, with the possibility of being reappointed for one more 
term. DSU, supra note 6, art. 17.2. For another, the persons selected are 
those of “recognized authority, with demonstrated expertise in law, 
international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements 
generally.” Id. art. 17.3. The DSU further prohibits a person’s 
participation in any dispute that “would create a direct or indirect 
conflict of interest.” Id. 
85. YANG GUOHUA ET AL., WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDERSTANDING: 
A DETAILED INTERPRETATION 205 (2005). 
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appellate process reduces appealable issues to those of law that are 
“covered in the panel report and legal interpretations developed by 
the panel.”86 Furthermore, the deadlines enumerated within the DSU 
for appellate decisions provide participants with a clearly defined 
timetable for the resolution of disputes.87 
The Appellate Body quickly demonstrated its efficacy as it 
resolved a number of high-profile, controversial cases that had been 
holdovers from the previous GATT era.88 The establishment and 
success of the appellate review within the WTO system provides 
China and the United States assurance that DSB litigation is not 
subject to a single panel determination, allowing either nation to 
target specific issues of law or legal interpretations thought to be 
incorrectly determined under the covered agreements. This feature 
instills confidence that the ultimate outcome of a contentious trade 
dispute between the United States and China will be properly 
adjudicated.89  
Third, the myriad issues presented in each case allow the DSB to 
render determinations that are “win-win” rather than merely a 
“winner-take-all” system.90 The DSB can achieve a mutually beneficial 
process through the application of independent review for resolving 
disputes.91 Impartiality, as a hallmark of the DSB, allows panelists to 
divorce trade issues from the typical state-centric political rhetoric. 
The ability to separate and resolve multiple issues through a trade- 
forum intermediary provides the United States and China benefits in 
dealing with trade frictions. The political connections that complicate 
complex trade issues can be disassociated from the appropriate 
adjudication under the WTO covered agreements.92  
 
86. DSU, supra note 6, art. 17.6.  
87. Id. art. 17.5; see also id. art. 20 (“time-frame for DSB decisions”).  
88. For a discussion of the six controversial holdover cases and how the 
Appellate Body’s resolution of these cases cemented its dominant role in 
the DSB, see William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: 
The First Ten Years, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 17, 21–23 (2005).  
89. See Stuart S. Malawer, United States-China WTO Litigation (2001–
2010), 59 VA. LAW. 28, 47 (2010) (“When litigation is resolved properly 
it establishes a strong basis to move forward in trade relations and 
negotiations.”). 
90. See Bown, supra note 37, at 31 (noting that the resolution of trade 
disputes between China and the United States can produce mutually 
beneficial economic outcomes through “market access gains to U.S. 
exporters and reforms that enhance China’s economic growth”). 
91. See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 317 (describing the impartial nature of 
international judges). 
92. See id. (identifying the potential for WTO litigation to “diffuse 
political tensions”).  
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This positive development in the resolution of complex trade 
issues is evident in the contentious dispute between Beijing and 
Washington over intellectual property protections within China.93 The 
United States brought three claims against China under the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS): the 
threshold for criminal procedures and penalties, the disposal of 
infringing goods, and the copyright protection for censored works.94 
While the Panel ruled favorably for the United States on the issues of 
the disposal of infringing goods and the copyright protection for 
censored works, the United States lost on the important issue of the 
threshold for criminal procedures and penalties.95 The panel’s mixed 
ruling allowed both sides to claim a successful outcome in the case.96 
The DSB was able to independently assess the complex, but related, 
claims and adjudicate each claim on its legal merit under the TRIPS 
agreement. Had these issues been subject to bilateral negotiations, the 
resolution of the trade friction may have been impossible due to 
political intermingling of all the issues into one “winner-take-all” 
scenario. This mentality may very well have escalated the trade 
frictions between Beijing and Washington into a full-blown trade war.  
The institutional characteristics of the DSB encourage the United 
States and China to utilize the dispute settlement forum to resolve 
contentious trade issues.97 As the WTO remedies a number of the 
inherent flaws that plagued the GATT system, members gain a 
greater confidence in the adjudicatory powers of the trade dispute 
 
93. China—Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 5, ¶ 1.1. 
94. Peter K. Yu, The U.S.-China WTO Cases Explained, MANAGING 
INTELL. PROP., Oct. 1, 2009, available at http://www.peteryu.com/mana
gingip_362.pdf. 
95. Id.; see also Hsieh, supra note 39, at 388 (“[E]ven though the panel 
found in favor of the U.S. on most issues, the U.S. did not prevail on its 
Article 61 claim, which was presumably the most important claim from 
the perspective of U.S. businesses.”). 
96. See, e.g., Yu, supra note 94 (“As the Acting US Trade Representative, 
maintained: ‘These findings are an important victory, because they 
confirm the importance of IPR protection and enforcement, and clarify 
key enforcement provisions of the TRIPs Agreement.’ The response by a 
spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, by contrast, was 
more subdued. Although he welcomed the report’s findings on criminal 
thresholds, he ‘expressed ‘regret’ about the [unfavorable] aspects of the 
ruling.’”). 
97. Some argue that while both countries continue to permit the DSB to 
adjudicate politically sensitive issues, neither is willing to litigate 
perhaps the most contentious issue between the two powers, the 
valuation of the Chinese currency. See Malawer, supra note 89, at 30, 32 
(calling the currency issue the “elephant in the room,” but ultimately 
concluding that it is not within the scope of the WTO disciplines). 
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settlement system.98 The features of the rule-based organization that 
have augmented its efficacy and the members’ willingness to utilize 
the DSB include its neutrality99 and legitimacy.100 The DSB provides 
members with a rule-oriented dispute settlement system with which 
to address trade frictions. The DSB provides tangible benefits through 
its remedy-limiting mechanisms, its appellate process, and its ability 
to adjudicate mutually beneficial situations. These benefits induce 
both the United States and China to continuously employ the DSB to 
mitigate trade frictions.  
B. Indirect Benefits that Induce Usage of the Dispute Settlement Body 
While the direct benefits from the DSB’s institutional 
characteristics help to explain the rationale underlying the United 
States’ and China’s decisions to join and use the WTO and its dispute 
settlement system, the indirect benefits accrued by both nations may 
illuminate why both powers have drastically increased their utilization 
of the litigation feature. One indirect benefit of advancing national 
ends through WTO litigation is the mollification of domestic anxiety 
in both the People’s Republic and the United States. Another benefit 
is the channeling of an individual nation’s behavior so as to produce a 
more cooperative international trading environment. The continuous 
usage of the DSB as a forum for trade dispute settlement instills a 
long-term investment for both nations in the longevity and ultimate 
viability of the organization.101 Additionally, the litigation focus 
through the DSB allows both Beijing and Washington to project “soft 
power” throughout the international system. Finally, experience with 
DSB litigation bolsters China’s internal legal capacity, which can 
generate positive benefits for both China and the international 
system. 
 
98. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
99. See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 219 (identifying the dispute settlement 
panel’s requirement to objectively assess the facts and the law pursuant 
to DSU Article 11); see also Ten Years in the WTO: Has China Kept 
Its Promises?: Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 
112th Cong. 45 (2011) [hereinafter Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. 
Comm’n on China] (statement of Claire E. Reade, Assistant U.S. Trade 
Rep. for China Affairs) available at http://www.cecc.gov/events/hearings
/ten-years-in-the-wto-has-china-kept-its-promises (“China’s WTO 
membership offers an important tool for managing the increasingly 
complex U.S.[-]China trade relationship. A common WTO ‘rule book’ 
and an impartial body in Geneva have helped [the United States and 
China] resolve differences when dialogue fail.”). 
100. See infra notes 119–20, 194 and accompanying text.  
101. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 22, at 576 (“China has become vested in 
the maintenance of the norms of the system.”).  
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The Sino-American relationship remains a salient political issue 
within the United States, with the People’s Republic often vilified. A 
number of subjects tend to ignite the ire of the American public and 
Congress, including human rights, currency manipulation, and trade 
frictions. The U.S. administration’s engagement of China through 
DSB litigation conveys a strong political stance in instances of 
perceived violations of China’s international obligations. This 
litigation strategy toward China helps to placate the American 
public’s anger as well as the calls for tougher legislation from 
Congress.102 The saber rattling from Congress can prove potentially 
catastrophic for U.S.-Chinese relations as protectionist trade 
legislation can spark damaging retaliatory policies from China.103 The 
U.S. administration can use WTO litigation to address issues 
preemptively before protectionist elements in Congress can act.104 For 
the American government, WTO litigation provides a unique ability 
to diffuse political tensions that could have deleterious ramifications 
for the long-term benefit of the Sino-American relationship.105  
While the Chinese government is not subject to the same 
democratic undulations, domestic pressure within China is of great 
concern to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) political stability. 
Economic concerns are always at the forefront of the CCP’s domestic 
and foreign policy, as demonstrated through the maintenance of the 
currency policy that has caused much contention. Sometimes, China’s 
initiation of WTO litigation is the direct result of domestic concerns 
toward particularly prominent trading partners.106 Like the United 
States, the Chinese government can utilize DSB determinations to 
implement or speed up reforms that may not be particularly popular 
domestically.107 This is particularly true in situations in China where 
 
102. See Malawer, supra note 89, at 30 (“The United States actively and 
aggressively uses the litigation process as a means for confronting China 
on a range of trade restrictions . . . . This clearly gives Congress and the 
American public the appearance of being tough on China . . . .”).  
103. See Bown, supra note 37, at 42–43 (examining the possible harms of 
Congressional protectionist measures on U.S.-Sino trade relations). 
104. Id.  
105. See, e.g., id. at 34 (emphasizing the importance that the U.S. Trade 
Representative and Beijing appropriately use WTO litigation to “diffuse 
political pressures within the United States”).  
106. See Malawer, supra note 89, at 30 (“China actively and aggressively 
uses the litigation process for both domestic and foreign policy 
purposes . . . [and] brings actions as a means of responding to domestic 
pressures.”). 
107. See id. at 30, 32 (“It allows the Beijing government to rationalize 
unpopular actions that need to be taken domestically in order to comply 
with WTO disciplines.”); see also Bown, supra note 37, at 38 (noting 
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reform, without DSB determinations, would be untenable. The 
prospect of WTO litigation and the permeation of DSB norms 
throughout China can provide the CCP domestic credibility for 
instituting reformist policies.108 Increasing WTO litigation and 
improving Chinese legal savvy can also provide the indirect benefit of 
bolstering the Chinese public’s faith in not only the WTO and DSB 
but also other international organizations.109 This provides the CCP 
with a stronger trade dispute mechanism that would have more 
support from the Chinese domestic populace.  
A dedication to resolving trade disputes through the DSB 
provides the governments in Beijing and Washington both clout and 
political protection.110 Given the complex political landscape, using the 
DSB allows both the United States and China to vent domestic 
frustrations through an international legal forum. The use of the DSB 
as a third-party intermediary allows both governments to deflect 
losses while still resolving tense political frictions. The DSB allows the 
United States and the People’s Republic to diffuse political tensions 
that can arise within a domestic market, especially with the public, 
media, and political figures. 
Another characteristic of the DSB, which may also characterize 
international organizations on a broader scale,111 is the ability to 
channel the behavior of member states.112 While realists may posit 
that states will always act with purely self-interested motives, within 
the legal framework of the DSB, such behavior may ultimately 
contribute to the long-term success of the dispute settlement body. 
The compulsory jurisdiction of the DSB assures members that 
involvement in the dispute settlement system will involve repeat 
participation, as both a complainant and respondent. This knowledge 
is bolstered through the explicit DSU requirement that all recourse 
concerning perceived violations of the WTO covered agreements be 
 
that China can use the U.S. threats of retaliation as “helpful political 
tools to complement its own reform effort”) (emphasis added). 
108. Bown, supra note 48, at 281.  
109. Bown, supra note 37, at 43; see also Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 31 
(arguing that the increase in litigation and regularity could help to 
dispel the Chinese suspicion of international organization and the 
imposition of international law in China). 
110. Bown, supra note 37, at 31.  
111. Cf. Ryan, supra note 15, at 394 (“Institutions are the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction.”). 
112. See McRae, supra note 24, at 6 (noting the ability of a legal system to 
channel the behavior of participants through “rules that provide 
guidance on how to behave or processes that make certain kinds of 
conduct possible”). 
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settled through the DSB mechanisms.113 The knowledge of recurring 
involvement in the DSB instills within both the United States and 
China an investment in the long-term success of the organization.114 
This commitment means that both countries will be willing to comply 
with an adverse ruling in hopes that the other will comply the next 
time it faces an adverse ruling.115 The understanding that future cases 
will be brought means neither nation will self-destruct the entire 
system.116 The DSB provides stability for conducting bilateral 
negotiations knowing that there is a formal, predictable system to 
resort to if negotiations collapse or if promises are broken. 
The WTO exemplifies the economic reality that all nations have 
interdependent economic systems. Accordingly, the appearance of 
trade frictions will not be an anomaly but rather a signature of a 
growing economic order in which interactions between members are 
ever-more prevalent and routine.117 The DSB’s legal functioning as the 
mechanism through which to resolve these trade frictions assures 
members of the reoccurrence of WTO disputes. In doing so, it 
establishes a significantly high threshold for measuring the importance 
of any one individual case or issue in the broader scheme of future 
DSB interactions as well as the enjoyment of other expected benefits 
provided under the covered agreements. The existence of this high 
threshold dissuades losing parties from persistently noncomplying or 
calling into question the legitimacy of the DSB itself.118 In the rule-
oriented dispute settlement structure of the DSB, all participants, 
whether a developed or a less developed country, have an interest in 
preserving the legitimacy of the dispute settlement system in order to 
accrue perceived benefits.119 As such, the behavior of member states is 
 
113. DSU, supra note 6, art. 23.  
114. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
115. See Granger, supra note 24, at 532 (“Countries believe that their future 
gains will be higher if the dispute settlement system has a high rate of 
compliance.”). 
116. The responses from the Chinese government have demonstrated a 
deliberate abstention from “making statements inside or outside the 
WTO that would call into question the authority of the dispute 
settlement system or discredit DSB rulings.” Kennedy, supra note 22, at 
576. Instead, Beijing tends to express its discontent with more tempered 
rhetoric so as not to question the overarching legitimacy of the DSB. Id. 
117. See Granger, supra note 24, at 532 (“States are aware of the importance 
of maintaining healthy long-term relations because they understand 
their trade prospects are integrally linked to their economic welfare.”). 
118. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text. 
119. Granger, supra note 24, at 532. For a discourse on a method for 
analyzing an the perceived legitimacy of an international tribunal or, in 
this case, an international dispute settlement body, see Laurence Helfer 
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channeled so as to preserve the longevity of the DSB. Both the 
United States and China thus have a sufficient vested interest in the 
DSB beyond any single dispute, with behavioral responses skewed 
toward compliance as well as an instilled reticence to indict any one 
DSB determination as perversely flawed or illegitimate. 
As China attempts to project its brand as an international power 
on a “peaceful rise,”120 it must employ tools other than its military 
might to advance this image. Professor Joseph Nye articulates that 
nations can exert influence and advance interest through the use of 
“soft power.”121 Nye defines soft power as “us[ing] a different type of 
currency (not force, not money) to engender cooperation—an 
attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing 
to the achievement of those values.”122 The DSB is a forum from 
which the Chinese government can project both its legal acumen and 
willingness to engage international organizations as a soft power.123 As 
a component of the peaceful-rise strategy, China is better able to 
protect its interests from within the WTO than challenging its 
legitimacy.124 The People’s Republic has demonstrated that it is 
making a good faith effort to adhere to the rules of the international 
system and to provide more transparency for its actions. Even when 
China loses an argument in the DSB, it continues to hone its 
litigation skills and demonstrates an investment in the long-term 
viability of the DSB.125 This is particularly important when China  
& Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 284–85 (1997).  
120. See Hsieh, supra note 39, at 375 (“China’s participation in the WTO 
demonstrates the nation’s willingness to engage the global economic order 
and is consistent with the country’s foreign policy mantra of ‘peaceful 
rise.’”); see also Tong Qi, China’s First Decade Experience in the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System: Practice and Prospect, 7 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 143, 169 (2012) (“China has self-managed its 
international image as a ‘trustworthy and responsible great power.’”). 
121. JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD 
POLITICS 5–6 (2004); see also DAVID SHAMBAUGH, CHINA GOES GLOBAL: 
THE PARTIAL POWER 207–68 (2013) (discussing and interpreting the 
status of China’s soft-power efforts). 
122. NYE, supra note 121, at 7; see also Qi, supra note 120, at 169 (“China is 
becoming more and more influential abroad by advancing its ‘soft 
power,’ which refers to a nation winning influence abroad by persuasion 
and appeal rather than by threats or military force.”).  
123. See Manjiao, supra note 22, at 48 (describing China’s growing activity 
in the DSB as a “manifestation of its growing soft power”).  
124. Kennedy, supra note 22, at 572.  
125. See Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 30 (detailing that through both 
offensive and defensive cases in the DSB, China has “obtained 
substantial experience” and has bolstered its knowledge on the rule-
based system of the DSB). 
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complies with an adverse ruling, demonstrating the validity of the 
DSB and projecting to other trading partners that compliance is 
required.126 This ensures that China can utilize the DSB in order to 
advance its own interests and to get other trading partners, like the 
United States, to alter policies that are unfavorable to the Chinese 
economic system.127 
One extension of this soft-power aspiration is the effect that 
active participation in DSB litigation has on the development of 
China’s legal institution, both specifically within WTO disputes as 
well as the spillover effect to other Chinese legal forums. When China 
entered the WTO in 2001, its domestic legal capabilities were brought 
under harsher scrutiny. China was obligated to reform its legal system 
as a prerequisite to WTO accessions, demonstrated through the 
promulgation of myriad laws that aimed to bolster an anemic legal 
system.128 At that time, China’s legal profession was woefully 
underdeveloped in both experience and domestic reverence, having 
nearly nonexistent exposure to international dispute settlement 
systems.129 Beijing was faced with the daunting task of confronting 
the WTO system’s sharp learning curve.130 In fact, some observers 
have speculated that China’s legal capacity deficiencies contributed to 
its hesitation during the initial period after accession.131 China 
recognized that the shortcomings of its legal system were jeopardizing 
its ability to effectively protect its trade interests through utilization 
of the DSB.132 The prospect of DSB litigation serves as a catalyst for 
 
126. See infra Part III.C (discussing China’s willingness to comply with an 
adverse ruling in China—Intellectual Property Rights). 
127. For an example of China’s successful ability to alter policies in the U.S. 
poultry industry, see infra Part III.C. 
128. See Li, supra note 47, at 1125–26 (“The shortage in human capital was 
particularly acute because China was required to revise a large number 
of existing laws and regulations in conformity with the WTO.”). 
129. See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 574 (“Chinese government lawyers had 
no prior experience of international dispute settlement, and the Chinese 
legal profession is small in relative terms and has a very short history.”).  
130. Gao, supra note 37, at 147. 
131. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  
132. China has commented on the deleterious impact that a laggard legal 
capacity can have on a member’s ability to protect interests in the DSB. 
China has previously cited the lack of human capital (in the legal 
profession) and financial resources, in conjunction with capacity and 
limited process exposure, as creating a circumstance that “results in de 
facto imbalance in the participation in the dispute settlement 
mechanism.” Kennedy, supra note 22, at 574 (quoting Dispute 
Settlement Body, Responses to Questions on the Specific Input of 
China, TN/DS/W/57 (May 15, 2003)). 
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China to implement measures to bolster its legal institutional 
capabilities. 
These measures focus on cooperation between the Chinese 
government and other individuals and organizations with legal 
knowledge beneficial for dealing with WTO dispute settlement. For 
example, in expanding the government’s ability to account for WTO 
accession, the Chinese State Council established a Division of WTO 
Law that retains in-house lawyers with specialized knowledge of 
international law and the WTO system.133 In addition, the Chinese 
government created a Permanent Mission in Geneva specifically for 
providing a more effective management of its DSB disputes.134 
Another feature is China’s adamancy in seeking out scholars, legal 
experts, and professionals from around the world to instruct and 
disseminate WTO legal expertise within the Chinese government, 
legal profession, and universities across China.135 Similarly, China has 
sent its legal experts abroad to study and practice international and 
WTO law at foreign universities and other world trade forums.136 
China has also fostered internal mechanisms for rapidly developing 
the legal acumen necessary for effective usage of the DSB, particularly 
through the generation of Chinese think tanks specialized in WTO 
law.137 Finally, China built its legal experience within the WTO 
through participation in WTO disputes as an interested third-party 
 
133. Manjiao, supra note 22, at 30.  
134. Id. 
135. For a discussion about the extent to which China has sought to bring 
legal experts into China to bolster its WTO legal experience and 
knowledge, see id. at 33.  
136. Howard Schneider, U.S. Racks up Wins over China, but Spoils Are 
Uncertain, WASH. POST, Aug. 9, 2012, at A11. An example of one such 
destination is Georgetown University’s Institute of International 
Economic Law. Id. 
137. A prime example of the Chinese home-grown WTO think tanks is the 
Shanghai WTO Affairs Consultation Center, sponsored by the Shanghai 
People’s Municipal Government. The Shanghai WTO Center provides 
consulting services on legal and policy issues related to the WTO. Gong 
Baihua, Shanghai’s WTO Affairs Consultation Center: Working 
Together to Take Advantage of WTO Membership, in MANAGING THE 
CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION 167, 168 (Peter Gallagher et al. 
eds., 2005). The institution further provides “WTO-related training 
services,” which is instrumental in disseminating broader general 
knowledge about China’s commitments and expectations in the WTO. 
Id. The Shanghai WTO Center’s services help Beijing manage WTO 
commitments and disputes more effectively. The institution provides 
notable support to both “central and regional governments in their 
adaptation to the WTO regime.” Id; see also Hsieh, supra note 38, at 
1013–15 (discussing the role of think tanks in bridging the “information 
and communication gaps”). 
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member.138 In doing so, China was able to observe the process without 
being directly involved as a complainant or respondent. The extent to 
which China is dedicating human capital and financial resources to 
honing its WTO litigation capacity demonstrates its commitment to a 
high-quality legal framework. 
As DSB litigation prompts China’s continued internal legal 
development, the benefits from a stronger, more adept legal 
institution may transfer to other aspects of Chinese society as well as 
China’s further interactions with other multilateral organizations. For 
one, active engagement in the international dispute settlement system 
can work toward strengthening the rule of law within China.139 As the 
People’s Republic dedicates more resources to the training and 
development of Chinese lawyers, the burgeoning legal profession has 
the potential to bolster other areas and forums of law within China. 
In acquiescing to the compulsory jurisdiction of the DSB and to WTO 
commitments, Beijing demonstrates the practical application of law as 
well as the ability of a rule-oriented dispute settlement mechanism to 
be a “powerful and effective way to guarantee that the laws are 
strictly followed by all members.”140 Additional benefitted institutions 
are the other multilateral regimes with which China interacts, both 
regionally and internationally. Some observers speculate that as China 
becomes more experienced and confident in the functioning of the 
DSB, this may create a shift in China’s perception of other 
multilateral organizations.141 While the WTO is the only international 
dispute settlement system from which China accepts compulsory 
 
138. Every WTO member has the right to participate in a dispute if it has a 
“substantial interest” in the dispute’s resolution. DSU, supra note 6, 
art. 10.2. The member is permitted the opportunity to “be heard by the 
panel and to make written submissions to the panel.” Id. During the 
initial period after China’s accession, Beijing reserved the right to third-
party status for most DSB disputes. See Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 
25 (noting that China reserved third-party status in every DSB panel 
established between August 2003 and early 2007). China was able to 
garner significant experience and knowledge for developing its own legal 
prowess with the DSB processes through the use of third-party status. 
See id. at 26 (“For the Chinese legal teams, the best way to follow and 
learn is to join in the practices [through third-party status] and to 
gather firsthand knowledge and experiences.”); see also Qi, supra note 
120, at 158 (discussing China’s rationale for utilizing third-party status 
as “primarily concerned with acquiring knowledge of the system”); 
Hsieh, supra note 38, at 1034 (analyzing China’s third-party 
participation as a low-cost means of providing China’s Department of 
Treaty and Law lawyers and Chinese law firms with DSB expertise).  
139. Manjiao, supra note 22, at 49.  
140. Id. 
141. See, e.g., Li, supra note 47, at 1136 (discussing the possibility of the 
attitudinal shift to diffuse to “other areas of regional and global 
governance . . . requiring multilateral efforts”). 
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jurisdiction, the positive experience within the DSB may foster a 
broader acceptance of multilateralism in Beijing that transcends to 
other multilateral organizations. 
These indirect benefits provide both the United States and China 
with hefty incentives for maintaining a strategy of using DSB 
litigation to resolve trade frictions. First, the DSB serves as an outlet 
through which the governments in both countries can vent domestic 
frustration. Being a legal intermediary aids in bolstering the 
legitimacy of reform efforts in China while also diffusing the political 
frustrations surrounding such reforms. Second, the DSB helps to 
stymie the desire to engage in tit-for-tat trade battles through the use 
of channeled behaviors as both nations realize that future litigation 
means a routinized compliance system. Third, accepting the DSB’s 
compulsory jurisdiction as an international dispute settlement body 
helps China project its soft-power presence within the global 
community. Finally, China’s involvement within DSB litigation 
fosters the development of Beijing’s legal capacity in regard to WTO 
litigation, the legal profession in China, and other multilateral regimes 
in which China is engaged. 
C. Compliance as an Indicator of Acceptance: U.S.—Poultry and 
China—Intellectual Property Rights  
The comprehensive compliance features of the DSB are one of the 
most important innovations of the WTO system, providing an 
enforcement mechanism within the international trading sphere.142 
While this Note recognizes that the DSB’s enforcement mechanisms 
are far from perfect, the DSB does provide an invaluable tool for 
stabilizing the international economic system.143 This Note advances 
the argument that compliance with DSB determinations through 
implementation is an indicator of a state’s willingness to accept the 
 
142. Article 21 of the DSU highlights the importance of compliance, 
recognizing that “[p]rompt compliance with recommendations or rulings 
of the DSB is essential in order to ensure effective resolution of disputes 
to the benefit of all Members.” DSU, supra note 6, art. 21.1. The DSU 
implements a number of methods for monitoring and enforcing 
compliance with panel and Appellate Body determinations. For one, the 
DSU institutes a surveillance system for monitoring a state’s compliance 
through a framework of specific deadlines. Id. art. 21.3. If these methods 
are unable to produce compliance, the DSU provides for targeted 
retaliation aimed at removing the noncompliant measures. See supra 
notes 74–75, 78 and accompanying text. 
143. But see MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 230 (“[W]hile the DSU is generally 
good at generating adopted reports, securing their implementation, 
particularly in sensitive or controversial cases, may be subject to 
considerable delay. One reason . . . is that the system described above 
provides cost-free opportunities for foot-dragging by the losing party.”). 
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legitimacy of the DSB.144 A state’s compliance illustrates its 
recognition of the underlying principles of the DSB, and the 
implementation reaffirms the state’s dedication to the long-term 
sustainability of the dispute settlement system.145 Thus, a state’s 
compliance record on adverse rulings serves as an effective mechanism 
for evaluating a state’s commitment to resolving trade frictions 
through the DSB.146  
In terms of compliance records for disputes between the United 
States and the People’s Republic, the record of cases reaching either 
panel or appellate determinations is relatively limited. As of 
April 2013, five of the eight disputes China initiated as complainant 
had reached some determinative level.147 The limited scope is more 
apparent in the number of disputes reaching panel or appellate 
determination when the United States initiates as a complainant—
seven out of fifteen cases.148 Since China’s accession to the WTO in 
2001, the Chinese government has often preferred to negotiate a 
settlement to the WTO dispute prior to the submission of the DSB 
determination.149 A complete summary of all cases between Beijing 
and Washington would be unnecessary for the purposes of this Note. 
Instead, an analysis of two representative disputes in which both 
countries faced adverse rulings provides a beneficial insight into the 
United States’ and China’s approaches to DSB compliance.  
In U.S.—Poultry, China requested a panel determination to 
challenge the United States’ measure concerning China’s access to the 
U.S. market for poultry.150 The measure at issue was section 727 of 
the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009,151 which prohibited the use 
of funds from the act to “establish or implement a rule allowing 
 
144. Because this Note focuses on litigation between the United States and 
China within the Dispute Settlement Body, analysis of China’s 
compliance with commitments not brought before the DSB are beyond 
its scope (specifically, compliance with China’s Accession Protocol 
requirements). 
145. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 22, at 580 (calling compliance and 
implementation the “ultimate test” for a state’s acceptance of the 
WTO’s rule-oriented system). 
146. Id. 
147. Chronological List of Disputes Cases, supra note 55. 
148. Id. 
149. See, e.g., China—Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309 
(Oct. 5, 2005) (mutually agreed solution); China—Measures Affecting 
Financial Information Services and Foreign Financial Information 
Suppliers, WT/DS373 (Dec. 4, 2008) (agreement through Memorandum 
of Understanding).  
150. U.S.—Poultry, supra note 4, ¶ 2.1. 
151. Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524 (2009).  
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poultry products to be imported” into the United States from 
China.152 The provision constructively prevented Chinese poultry from 
being reimported into the United States after the U.S. Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) had determined that China was once again 
eligible to export poultry product to the United States.153 This USDA 
determination removed the total ban on Chinese poultry that was 
imposed in response to the avian flu epidemic in 2004.154  
China put forward a number of claims under various WTO-
covered agreements, including Articles I and XI of the 1994 GATT 
Agreement on Agriculture and the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
Agreement.155 The Panel in U.S.—Poultry held, with regard to the 
most important issues, that section 727 was inconsistent with U.S. 
obligations under GATT156 and the SPS Agreement.157 Furthermore, 
the Panel rejected the United States’ assertion of Article XX(b) of the 
GATT 1994 that claimed the measure was enacted in order to 
“protect human and animal life and health from the risk posed by the 
importation of poultry products from China.”158 Despite the dispute 
involving an important national issue—health and safety—the United 
States did not appeal the determination. In fact, as the Panel noted, 
the measure in contest expired two days after China submitted its 
first written submission.159 Although the measure expired prior to the 
Panel report, the dispute still provides a valuable insight into the 
United States’ approach to compliance with adverse DSB rulings 
involving China. The Panel addressed the fundamental issue of 
whether it was able to rule on an expired measure, illustrating the 
impact on compliance concerns. The Panel noted that the inconsistent 
measure was a component of an annual U.S. appropriations 
legislation; in fact, the inconsistent language was a reiteration of a 
previous appropriations provision.160 Since the United States never 
conceded that the measure was inconsistent with its WTO 
obligations, without a DSB determination, the United States could 
have “easily re-imposed” the offending measure.161 While this dispute  
152. Id. ¶ 2.2. 
153. Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 8. 
154. Id. 
155. U.S.—Poultry, supra note 4, ¶ 7.59. 
156. E.g., id. ¶ 7.441 (finding the measure inconsistent with Article I:1 of the 
GATT 1994). 
157. E.g., id. ¶¶ 7.204, 7.294 (finding the measure inconsistent with Articles 
5.1, 5.2, and 5.5 of the SPS Agreement). 
158. Id. ¶¶ 7.458, 7.483. 
159. Id. ¶ 7.51. 
160. Id. ¶ 7.55. 
161. Id. 
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did not require the United States to take any proactive step in 
removing the offending measure, the DSB determination established 
the inconsistency of such a provision in future legislation. The United 
States demonstrated its willingness to comply with the Panel’s 
determination through the continued omission of a similar provision 
in subsequent annual appropriations legislation.  
Similarly, China was faced with an adverse panel ruling in 2008 
over intellectual property rights protections.162 The Panel analyzed 
three claims the United States brought against China under the 
TRIPS Agreement.163 The United States challenged several Chinese 
measures, or lack thereof, including: (1) a lack of adequate thresholds 
for “criminal procedures and penalties to be applied in cases of wilful 
[sic] trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial 
scale”;164 (2) “China's measures for disposing of confiscated goods that 
infringe intellectual property rights”;165 and (3) “denying the 
protection of its Copyright Law to creative works of authorship” for 
works not authorized for publication or distribution within China.166  
The Panel in China—Intellectual Property Rights presented a 
detailed assessment of each claim’s individual legality. With regard to 
the first issue on criminal thresholds, the Panel determined that the 
United States had not established any inconsistency in China’s 
measure.167 The Panel found in favor of the United States on the other 
two issues concerning customs measures168 and the Copyright Law.169 
The Panel recommended “pursuant to Article 19.1 of the DSU that 
China bring the Copyright Law and the customs measures into 
conformity with its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement.”170 
In response to the Panel’s determination, China informed the 
DSB that it would comply with the Panel’s recommendations.171 Here, 
as with the United States in U.S.—Poultry, China did not appeal the 
Panel’s ruling. China implemented internal changes to both measures 
 
162. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
163. China—Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 5, ¶¶ 2.2-2.4; see supra 
note 94 and accompanying text. 
164. China—Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 5, ¶ 2.2. 
165. Id. ¶ 2.3. 
166. Id. ¶ 2.4. 
167. Id. ¶ 7.669. 
168. Id. ¶ 7.395(c). 
169. Id. ¶ 7.191. 
170. Id. ¶ 8.4. 
171. Communication from China, China—Measures Affecting the Protection 
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/11 (Apr. 
15, 2009).  
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found inconsistent with China’s TRIPS Agreement obligations. China 
notified the DSB that the Standing Committee of the Eleventh 
National People’s Congress had adopted an amendment to the 
Copyright Law to bring the measure into conformity.172 In addition, 
the State Council of the People’s Republic amended the customs 
measures in order to comply with the remainder of the Panel’s 
recommendations.173 Subsequently, on April 20, 2010, China notified 
the DSB that it was compliant with regard to all measures found 
inconsistent in China—Intellectual Property Rights.174 This case 
indicates China’s willingness to comply with the adverse rulings and 
bring its inconsistent measures into conformity with its WTO 
obligations. 
While the cases discussed demonstrate a good record on DSB 
compliance from the United States and China, U.S.—Poultry and 
China—Intellectual Property Rights represent a small body of 
available DSB-compliance cases between the two nations. Many allege 
that the United States is a notoriously noncompliant state within the 
WTO because the United States has repeatedly been accused of 
delaying compliance.175 However, when faced with adverse rulings in 
disputes with China, the United States has maintained a better 
compliance record, although not always through routine means of 
implementation.176 For China, many scholars laud its compliance 
record within the DSB as one demonstrating a “responsible attitude 
toward its international obligations.”177 In terms of additional 
 
172. Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations 
and Rulings in the Dispute by China, China—Measures Affecting the 
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 
WT/DS362/14/Add.2 (Mar. 9, 2010). 
173. Kennedy, supra note 22, at 581. 
174. Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 19 (citing Dispute Settlement Body, 
Minutes of Meeting, ¶ 82, WT/DSB/M/282 (Apr. 20, 2010)). 
175. See id. at 4 n.9 (citing a representative example of U.S. delayed 
compliance).  
176. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Definitive Anti-
Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
WT/DS379/AB/R (Mar. 11, 2011) (implementing the determination on 
August 13, 2012, with no compliance proceeding initiated); see also Ji & 
Huang, supra note 36, at 4 (discussing the United States’ removal of the 
disputed measures in U.S.—Steel Safeguards only days before the 
adoption of the DSB report). 
177. Qi, supra note 120, at 169; see also, e.g., Manjiao, supra note 22, at 37 
(discussing China’s “positive attitude toward WTO dispute 
settlement”); Kennedy, supra note 22, at 588 (praising China for not 
“challeng[ing] the authority of the WTO dispute settlement system or 
attempt[ing] to frustrate the procedures”); Malawer, supra note 89, at 
32 (acknowledging that China has been “playing by the rules of the 
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compliance instances, both nations have notified the DSB of the 
implementation of two adverse panel determinations in 2013; one 
against China (China—Electronic Payment Services)178 and one 
against the United States (U.S.—Shrimp and Sawblades).179 In both 
cases, the losing party informed the DSB that it intends to comply 
with the determination, implementing the recommendations within 
the negotiated reasonable period of time deadline under Article 
21.3(b) of the DSU.180 If the trend toward increased usage of the DSB 
to resolve U.S.-Sino trade frictions continues, the record of disputes 
reaching either panel or appellate determinations should increase in 
frequency.181 Ultimately, this will provide a greater sample size for 
determining the degree to which the United States and China are 
willing to implement adverse rulings. If either nation consistently fails 
to implement determinations in the future, the viability of the DSB to 
resolve trade frictions may be jeopardized because noncompliance may 
instigate reciprocal noncompliance from the other nation. 
D. Less Appealing Alternatives to the Dispute Settlement System 
One of many factors inducing China and the United States to 
engage one another in the DSB is that alternative mechanisms for 
alleviating trade frictions are not as alluring. First, bilateral 
negotiations present a number of obstacles that can prove ineffectual 
 
international trading system [which] indicat[es] a growing support of 
that system”).  
178. Panel Report, China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment 
Services, WT/DS413/R (July 16, 2012). 
179. Panel Report, U.S.—Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp and Diamond 
Sawblades from China, WT/DS422/R (June 8, 2012). 
180. On July 11, 2013, China notified the DSB of its implementation of the 
Panel’s determination in China—Electronic Payment Services. Status 
Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and 
Rulings in the Dispute by China, China—Certain Measures Affecting 
Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/9/Add.1 (July 12, 2013). 
Likewise, the United States notified the DSB on March 14, 2013 of its 
implementation of the adverse ruling in U.S.—Shrimp and Sawblades. 
Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations 
and Rulings in the Dispute by the United States, United States—Anti-
Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from 
China, WT/DS422/8/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2013). 
181. Two disputes initiated by China are currently in the panel stage of the 
DSB process. Chronological List of Disputes Cases, supra note 55. On 
the other hand, the United States has five disputes against China in the 
consultation and panel stages of the DSB. Id. If these disputes 
ultimately result in a DSB determination, the resulting implementation 
efforts will illuminate whether the United States and China, when faced 
with more potential adverse rulings, will continue to maintain a good 
compliance record.  
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at resolving complex and politically sensitive trade disputes.182 Trade 
relations between two powers are often extremely complex, especially 
considering the diverse expectations and interests between the United 
States and China. Bilateral relations have the potential to succumb to 
volatile national interests because multiple, complex issues are woven 
into inseparable political interests creating an impasse in 
negotiations.183 Furthermore, when bilateral negotiations deteriorate, 
it can lead to unconstrained unilateral retaliation. Unilateral actions 
have the potential to spark tit-for-tat retaliation between the 
countries, leading to a worsened trade environment.184  
Secondly, the prospects of multilateral negotiations resolving 
trade disputes or remedying flaws in the current system remain far 
from certain. While the Doha Round185 of negotiations concerning 
further WTO development continues, little progress has been made in 
reaching consensus on major issues.186 The Doha Round of discussions 
has effectively stalled, and expectations of meaningful reform do not 
appear reasonable in the near future. In fact, the inability of members 
to utilize the WTO’s rule-making function to enact fundamental 
changes through the Doha Round further augments the role of the 
DSB in resolving current trade frictions.187 The self-interest of 
invested parties can cause important issues to become intractable, 
reducing the efficacy of both bilateral and multilateral negotiations.  
This Note recognizes that the other forms for resolving trade 
frictions remain useful mechanisms, which DSB litigation will not 
outright supplant. Instead, the role of WTO litigation as a tool with 
 
182. See Malawer, supra note 89, at 32 (discussing how bilateral trade 
discussions “repeatedly fail to reach accommodations”). 
183. See MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 236 (“[T]rade disputes are complex, 
often involve changing economic and political interests and are capable 
of arousing strong national passions.”).  
184. See Bown, supra note 37, at 42–43 (examining the retaliatory events 
that can follow U.S. Congressional unilateral action against China and 
the deleterious effects of those actions). In addition to the damage to 
economic factors, unilateral action also imposes a burden to demonstrate 
the legal basis for the restriction within the international community. 
Id. at 42.  
185. Launched in 2001, the Doha Round “is the latest round of trade 
negotiations among the WTO membership. Its aim is to achieve major 
reform of the international trading system through the introduction of 
lower trade barriers and revised trade rules.” The Doha Round, World 
Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/d
da_e.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2013). 
186. See, e.g., Malawer, supra note 89, at 32 (noting that the “multilateral 
negotiation process of rule-making” has become “bogged down” in the 
Doha Round of negotiations).  
187. Kennedy, supra note 22, at 572. 
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which to mollify trade frictions is expanding within the framework of 
U.S.-Sino relations.188 The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is 
particularly important when bilateral negotiations break down, 
requiring another intermediary to mitigate the trade frictions.189 As 
trade frictions between the United States and China proliferate, the 
unique position of the DSB as a compulsory international dispute 
settlement body provides both countries with a viable—and perhaps 
preferred—method of handling trade issues. 
IV. Limitations to the Theory 
As with any mechanism for resolving disputes between diverse 
parties, the efficacy and viability of the DSB is subject to limitations. 
One limitation is the particular political conditions that can prove to 
be extremely volatile.190 Another limitation is that the system can 
only be effective insofar as both the People’s Republic and the United 
States continue to subjectively believe the DSB is legitimate, fair, and 
impartial.191 The involved parties must have confidence in the dispute 
settlement process for the benefits discussed in Parts III.A and III.B 
to accrue and for the DSB to have long-term success.192 If either  
188. While the statements of the U.S. Trade Representative on China’s 
WTO Compliance demonstrate a commitment to traditional bilateral 
and multilateral methods, they also express the United States’ 
willingness to use the DSB without hesitation. Compare U.S. TRADE 
REP., 2012 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE 12 
(2012) (“The [U.S.] Administration will use all available tools to achieve 
these objectives, including the pursuit of productive, outcome-oriented 
dialogue in both bilateral and multilateral settings . . . .”), with id. (“At 
the same time, as the United States has repeatedly demonstrated, when 
dialogue is not successful in resolving WTO-related concerns, the United 
States will not hesitate to invoke the dispute settlement mechanism at 
the WTO where appropriate.”). 
189. See id. at 23 (noting that when bilateral negotiations failed to remedy 
the United States’ concerns, the United States utilized the DSB to hold 
China accountable for adherence to WTO rules); see also Hearing 
Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, supra note 99, at 45 (“A 
common WTO ‘rule book’ and an impartial body in Geneva have helped 
the two sides resolve differences when dialogue fails.”).  
190. See supra note 183; see also, e.g., Ji & Huang, supra note 36, at 37 
(discussing the potentially harmful effect of politically sensitive issues on 
China’s “prompt and proper” compliance); Kennedy, supra note 22, at 
574 (“The sensitivity in China regarding some of the issues . . . is 
illustrated by the fact that access to the International Economic Law 
and Policy blog, well-known in WTO circles around the world, was 
blocked in China for a time.”).  
191. See Bown, supra note 37, at 43 (discussing the possibility that, if the 
system is perceived as unfair, there could be “calls” for China to 
withdraw from the DSB). 
192. See supra notes 112–19 and accompanying text. 
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country begins to feel as though it is the target of arbitrary or 
capricious DSB determinations, the country’s willingness to utilize the 
dispute settlement mechanism may drastically wane.193 Furthermore, 
persistent noncompliance with DSB determinations, from either 
Washington or Beijing, may undermine the DSB’s legitimacy and 
cause a reciprocal pattern of noncompliance.194 Persistent 
noncompliance would have a rippling effect throughout the WTO as 
an effective enforcement mechanism is necessary to protect and ensure 
the commitments and expectations of member states.  
The extreme of these limitations is that either China or the 
United States could lose complete faith in the DSB. This result would 
diminish the DSB’s long-term effectiveness as countries refuse to 
resort to WTO litigation. Such diminishment would be evidenced by: 
(1) plummeting compliance rates, (2) more unilateral trade 
retaliations, and (3) increased potential for a full-blown trade war. 
While the extreme scenario is highly improbable, both countries 
should be wary of the potential for a slippery slope of system abuse. 
Although the increased litigation between the United States and 
China in the DSB has effectively managed trade frictions between the 
parties, bestowing both direct and indirect benefits, the operation of 
the DSB as an international dispute settlement mechanism is subject 
to potential erosions in legitimacy.195 
Conclusion 
Ever-expanding global trade relations have spawned highly 
contentious disputes between the United States and China, two of the 
world’s most powerful economic juggernauts. The volatility of these 
 
193. Bown, supra note 37, at 43; see also MERRILLS, supra note 9, at 236 
(“[A]n insistence on established rules can only be effective if the rules in 
question are not only interpreted competently, but also regarded as 
appropriate, and as such command general acceptance.”).  
194. See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 587 (warning of the danger that China 
may view “past and present cases of non-compliance” as the status quo 
and change its implementation approach to mimic the perceived 
normative practice). 
195. Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter analyzed the importance of 
legitimacy in supranational adjudication as the ability to “command 
acceptance and support from the community.” Laurence Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational 
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 284 (1997) (quoting ARCHIBALD COX, 
THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 103 
(1976)). The erosion of the DSB’s legitimacy can occur through a 
number of events dealing with members’ perception of the institution 
(for example, loss of impartiality; flawed decision making, either in 
principle or reasoning; and lack of consistency in DSB determinations). 
Cf. id. at 284 (describing some of the “formulations of the sources of 
judicial legitimacy”).  
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disputes has caused numerous observers to opine that trade frictions 
could devolve into an outright trade war. The United States and 
China have demonstrated a willingness to utilize the DSB and its 
rule-oriented structure to mitigate the harmful effects of possible 
trade warfare. While the design of the DSB is not perfect, its 
institutional structure provides a number of direct benefits that 
induce member participation. This Note examined how these direct 
benefits ensure a stable economic environment through a highly 
regulated remedy structure, an appellate system to serve as a legal 
safeguard, and an independent quasi-judicial body to diminish 
political unpredictability on issue determination. Aside from these 
institutional benefits, the indirect benefits that both Washington and 
Beijing accrue help explain the surge in desire to resort to DSB 
litigation. For one, both the U.S. and Chinese governments can garner 
political protection from utilizing the DSB as an intermediary through 
which to release domestic frustrations. Additionally, the DSB also 
assists in channeling member behavior toward a long-term investment 
in the international economic system, projecting soft power, and 
building the Chinese legal capacity. The attractiveness of DSB 
litigation continues to grow as other mechanisms for resolving trade 
frictions fail to provide suitable resolution, including both bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations. This Note examined the dedication of 
both the United States and the People’s Republic to the long-term 
viability of the system through an analysis of compliance with DSB 
determinations. In both U.S.—Poultry and China—Intellectual 
Property Rights, the countries accepted the recommendations of the 
DSB and brought the offending measures into conformity with WTO 
obligations 
Ultimately, both the United States and China must devote great 
care and attention to the management of DSB litigation. The United 
States must be wary of vilifying China when trade frictions arise; such 
a perception can foster anti-Chinese sentiment which can lead to 
protectionist measures. The growth in protectionist measures 
predicated on domestic ire will frustrate the effective operation of the 
DSB and diminish the direct and indirect benefits that the 
organization provides. The United States should recognize the 
significance of China’s willingness to resolve trade frictions through a 
compulsory, third-party intermediary. Although litigation is 
adversarial in nature, the United States would benefit from a stronger 
Chinese confidence in international dispute settlement systems.  
While the DSB is providing a means of resolving tense trade 
issues, the efficacy and legitimacy of the system is predicated on the 
United States’ and China’s perceptions of the DSB’s fairness, 
impartiality, and legal quality. Although some commentators 
interpret the increased DSB litigation as foreshadowing an impending 
trade war, the discourse must be transformed into a broader scrutiny 
of the role of the DSB and the approach that the United States and 
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China have taken toward trade disputes. With responsible 
management of DSB litigation, the countries are able to benefit from 
the existence of a highly functioning international legal forum. As 
illustrated by DSB interactions since China’s accession to the WTO, 
the United States and the People’s Republic have much to gain from 
the usage of the DSB to resolve contentious trade frictions and would 
do well to maintain such an advantageous system. 
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